[1IP-#] 1inch DAO Meta-Governance Delegation ⏹ Governance Booster

[1IP-#] 1inch DAO Meta-Governance Delegation

:white_square_button: Ramp up Governance Engagement & Organizational Strength

:radio_button: Purpose

Creation/ Encouragement of Meta-Delegates

:radio_button: Simple Summary

This initiative aims to improve governance engagement while including culture & values among the DAO as 1inch deems itself as Defi Single Entry Point . With this program, Various dedicated organizations will be able to hold discussions, work on specific activities, propose new ideas, & participate in building the future of the 1inch protocol. This will welcome organizations interested in the topic of DAOs, contributing significantly to the growth of the 1inch ecosystem.

:white_large_square: Abstract

This Proposal addresses the new approach of meta-delegation by involving student groups & similar consortia in DAO governance. It provides insights into current practices & highlights potential pathways to implementation.

:white_large_square: Motivation / Why does Metagovernance matter ?

In DAOs we rely on the governance contribution & decision-making activities from token holders. Ideation, proposal writing, voting, & strategy challenging from technical, legal, economic, & social perspectives are just some of the requirements. Thus, diversity & knowledgeability amongst the governance contributors become a competitive advantage of every DAO.

However, many DAOs struggle to fulfill these demands.
DeepDAO shows that in most DAOs only 1–3% of token holders become active, which at times can make it difficult to reach the minimum voter threshold (quorum)

With voting fatigue becoming more apparent & lobbying tendencies on the rise, the question of how to involve & activate stakeholders in decentralized governance processes is hotly debated. This is all the more important as DAOs are rapidly growing in value & size.

Most protocols have a governance structure that requires their token holders to vote & pass proposals. In order for votes to move forward, they have to reach quorum. Reaching quorum can be hard to do since many tokenholders aren’t interested in voting (Kevin Owocki recently estimated that DAO voting participation typically hovers around 2%.) This can make it difficult for protocols to make the changes necessary to keep up with the ever-shifting DeFi environment.

:green_circle: Do you feel 1inch should have More Active Governance Participations ?
  • :white_check_mark:

0 voters

:white_large_square: Rationale :green_circle:

Several DAOs have decided to involve university organizations in their governance activities. Groups of students & researchers, motivated by their interest in decentralized organizations & DeFi, delve into the activities of discussions, proposals, & storytelling of new ideas.
The rationale behind selecting university organizations & other for this phase of the program is that students are interested in applying practically what has so far been learned theoretically. They will live this experience as a unique entity, as a community.

:white_large_square: The Problems with Traditional GTs

Governance tokens play a vital, directional role in the operation of DeFi protocols. However, the traditional design & implementation of GTs pose challenges for user engagement, participation, & satisfaction. PowerPool aims to address two prominent issues related to GTs:

  1. Minority token holders cannot influence votes. As a result, most protocols governed by token holders face Voters’ Apathy & declining engagement, common on-chain governance problems.

  2. The majority of tokens don’t provide token holders any income. Lacking cash flows, the fundamental monetary value of governance tokens for minority stakeholders is negligible .

Over the past year or two, the evolution of governance participation within DAOs has looked something like:

⦁ Token holders believing they can participate in all governance decisions
⦁ Token holders realizing they can’t participate in all governance decisions
⦁ Token holders delegating to individuals with perceived specialized expertise & b&width
⦁ Token holders & individual delegates realizing delegate models have been constructed ineffectively

Looking back, it’s easy to see why individual delegate participation has not yielded the results token holders have been looking for; individual delegates have misaligned incentives, unclear delineation of responsibilities, & an inherent inability to scale their impact. However, not all hope is lost. Metagovernance committee delegate models can improve governance effectiveness & participation that result from individual delegate models.

As a possible resolution to the Centralization of Voting Power Amongst Delegate problem, I propose the encouragement of meta-governance-abiding organizations to appoint itself as a delegate & begin active participation. To some extent, this may be perceived as DeFi Political Parties - I would agree upon this identification. By supporting meta-delegates (meta-governance), the overarching Uniswap governance model is further reinforced by two factored governance process. Instead of having an individual delegate unilaterally vote on a proposal, emboldening the involvement of a Meta-Delegate would offer a more diligent & inclusive approach that would truly embody the community’s sentiment.

:white_large_square: Metagovernance Committee Delegate Model | Advantages :green_circle:

There are many reasons why dedicated & structured metagovernance committees are better suited to participate as delegates within DAOs

Aligned incentives

⦁ In contrast to individual delegates (whose reputational capital can be built & maintained in many ways outside of their governance participation within DAOs), metagovernance committees serving as delegates have the sole purpose of effectively stewarding governance towards achieving the mission of the DAO, while representing the needs & values of their constituency. The br&s, identities & value creation & capture models of these metagovernance committees are intimately tied with their ability to effectively participate in governance. Because of this, metagovernance committees have more skin in the game & much greater downside risk when ineffectively participating in governance, especially relative to individual delegates.
⦁ Combining extrinsic reputational incentives with extrinsic financial or social incentives unlocks powerful self-fulfilling flywheels that drive greater levels of accountability & performance.


⦁ As mentioned earlier, there are several traits of individual delegate models that lead to an inability to scale effective governance participation within DAOs. Individual delegates tend to be over-committed to various projects, introduce single points of failure, & are less effective at complex decision-making relative to groups.
⦁ With structured metagovernance pods, a flexible container is created that supports the cycles of onboarding & offboarding individuals dedicated to metagovernance participation. These governance participant entities are highly aligned & responsible stewards of delegated governance rights - which should address the low on-chain delegate governance participation that we have historically seen.
In addition, dedicated metagovernance committees are better equipped to support the complex & nuanced decision-making that DAOs require of delegates. Delegators & stakeholders should have confidence that the decisions being made by this delegate group are informed–the multiple values, perspectives, & knowledge bases of committee participants ensures there is a level of depth & breadth in the decision-making process.

:white_large_square: 1inch Meta Delegate Program: Benefits for Students :large_orange_diamond:

I. Guided Preparation & execution of a voting delegation pitch (transfer of voting power from 1inch token holders to the student group)
II. Instant Media exposure by publishing content in 1inch Medium & Twitter | 1M followers
III. Exclusive Delegation Power Handed over by Treasury Allocation
IV. 1inch POAPs (NFTs certification) for different engagement levels
V. Extra Revenue : can be claimed by clubs if DAO proposal of this Type passes where DAO is generating earning which stakers can extract according to 50% of their Staked Value [ 50% or more this can be changed later ]

:clock3: Organizations Onboarding Process & Criteria :green_circle:

⦁ Open Invitation to organizations that are interested in blockchain & willing to play a key role in DeFi & DAOs.
⦁ 1inch PR Managers initiate several Talks & Collaboration to select the Right fit for this initiative.
⦁ AMA & Community calls with these Organisations
⦁ Creation of Profile & Pitch Repository on 1inch Github 1inch Network · GitHub or 1inch Discord Subsection [ Section To be made] or Commonwealth or https://gov.1inch.io/ with following details

Profile & Pitch Template

⦁ [ Delegate’s Name]
⦁ Key Info
⦁ Delegate’s address: [0x71C…]
⦁ Commonwealth name (if any): [@Delegate]
⦁ Discord ID (if any): [@Delegate]
⦁ Twitter h&le (if any): [@Delegate]
⦁ Email (optional): [Delegate@gmail.com]:
⦁ External website (optional): [1inch.io]
⦁ Introduction video link (optional): [YouTube]
⦁ Delegate’s voting power (includes voting power from 1inch /st1inch held & voting power received from delegation): [#]
⦁ Delegate’s proposing power (includes proposing power from 1inch /st1inch held & proposing power received from delegation): [#]

Delegate Assessment Score Card

The Delegate Assessment Score is self-reported & is intended to provide 1inch holders with deeper information about a Delegate.

⦁ Delegate Name
⦁ Alignment
⦁ Experience
⦁ Engagement
⦁ Diversity
⦁ Conflicts

Total Score = Out of 100

Assessment Score System

20 – High-level commitment to the 1inch protocol & governance. Delegate will benefit if the 1inch protocol grows.
10 – Some commitment to the 1inch protocol & governance. Delegate may indirectly benefit if the 1inch protocol grows.
0 – No commitment to the 1inch protocol & governance.


20– Delegate has a professional background in crypto governance, smart contract development, code auditing, financial risk modeling, DeFi protocols, or similar.
10 – Delegate has a personal interest in the criteria listed above.
0 – Delegate has an unrelated background.


20– Delegate has a strong history of participating in forums, voting &/or participating with other relevant communities.
10 – Delegate has a limited history of community engagement.
0 – Delegate has no history of community engagement.

Diversity of Perspective

20– Delegate has a unique perspective compared to other delegates.
10– Delegate represents a perspective that is underrepresented in governance.
0 – Delegate represents a perspective that is widely represented in governance.


20- Delegate has no existing conflicts with the 1inch protocol, & would not benefit in any way from the 1inch protocol’s failure.
10 - Delegate has no outright conflicts with the 1inch protocol, but may benefit in some unusual circumstances if the 1inch protocol fails.
0 - Delegate has an outright conflict with the 1inch protocol, or may benefit in typical circumstances if the protocol fails.

Delegates Code of Conduct

The reputation of the 1inch protocol, its governance & its community is essential to the growth of the 1inch protocol. Delegates must be honest & earn the trust of the community.

Best Interests

Delegates should vote in line with the best interests of the 1inch protocol.


Delegates should conduct themselves professionally & act in a respectful manner.

Responsiveness & Community Engagement

Delegates should use their best efforts to connect with the 1inch community & be accessible to answer questions & respond to comments.


Delegates should maintain a vote participation rate above 90%.


Delegates should provide their reasoning for any proposal, vote or decision that they make in connection with being a Delegate.

Conflicts of Interest

Delegates should avoid conflicts of interest & circumstances that reasonably present the appearance of a conflict.

End of Delegation

Delegates should communicate their intention to stop being a Delegate at least one epoch in advance to give notice to the 1inch community & provide sufficient time for 1inch /st1inch holders to delegate their 1inch /st1inch to other potential delegates.


Why do you want to be a Delegate & why should 1inch /st1inch holders delegate to you?
[Motivation for becoming an Delegate & vision for the future of the 1inch protocol &/or its governance, such as improving an aspect of the 1inch protocol, raising viewpoints from an underrepresented group, etc.]

How will you connect with & contribute to the 1inch community & governance?
[What are you going to do to advance the 1inch community & governance, how will you communicate your views, how will you connect with community members, applicable background knowledge or skills, etc.]

Delegates Declaration

⦁ I confirm that the information above is accurate & up to date as of the start of the current epoch & I will immediately update this Profile & Pitch in the event of a material change.
⦁ I have read & agree to abide by the Delegates Code of Conduct.
⦁ I have completed & scored [ ]/10 on the Delegate Self Assessment. Please find my Self Assessment linked here: [Insert link]. -

DAO Treasury Allocation Poll : How Much Funds we must Allocate to this Program from DAO treasury .

The Funds are in USDC in the Treasury & will be converted to buyback $1inch from Open Market
These 1inch will then be staked thus Getting st1inch in Return. The st1inch Tokens HOLDs Voting Power that can be used for Snapshot Votes by these Blockchain Clubs .

MultiSig will control the Funds but how the st1inch Delegation Power will be distributed among the Parties will be decided by the Amount of their Quality Engagement in Forum .

For the Start , 1 Month period is Allocated in which Different Blockchain clubs can participate in DAO . At the end , 1inch Team will formalize a List of Worthy Blockchain clubs to which the Delegation power [ Let’s say 1M st1inch Voting Power ] will be divided equally .

:white_circle: Final Thoughts :thought_balloon:

⦁ 1inch’s Governance model is in need of a major restructuring in order to truly attain a maximal viable participatory community & resolve its Principal-Agent problem.
⦁ The deprecation/minimization of individual delegates & the endorsement of Meta-Delegates would contribute to the sustainability of a democratic & scalable governance ecosystem with an explicit emphasis on community ownership.
⦁ Experimentation will likely yield long-term value capture from governance contributors.
⦁ Information Symmetry is paramount.

:white_circle: How will it Benefit the 1inch community :speech_balloon:

⦁ While the trend of governance delegation to individuals had all the best of intentions, it is clear that it has fallen short of expectations. The combination of the time-commitment & depth required for participation, misaligned incentives & accountability mechanisms, & legal complexity has made it impossible for governance delegation to fulfill its promise.
⦁ Because of this underperformance, it is clear that the rising prevalence of metagovernance committees is the next logical experiment to drive meaningful progress within DAOs. Metagovernance committees are better positioned to create aligned incentives with stakeholders & have structures suited to provide scaled governance impact.
The beauty of supporting Meta-Delegates is the internal checks & balances that need to be applied in order for a decision to be made. A DAO could not appoint itself as a delegate without taking into account the leaning(s) of the community. By enabling the formation of DeFi Political Parties, we may see more engagement both internally (within each respective meta-delegate) & externally throughout the protocol’s ecosystem.

Closing Thoughts :left_speech_bubble:

This would be a functional first step to engage greater delegation & decisioning, especially if there’s not enough governance discussions happening .

Resources -

Helpful Links to Potential Blockchain Clubs


Some of members work at Rari Capital, NEAR, & Index


Past guest speakers include those from OpenSea, Amber Group etc.


BEN has over 2,350 students & graduates from across 1,000 universities in over 96 countries. BEN has 8 national chapters in USA, Canada, Australia, Italy, India, Dubai, Colombia, & Vietnam.

Group Supporting Near


Owned by 0x9edf5D95d06f94C82e71BD7F702568A757185132


This seems to be a Good Initiative . I’ve seen Bunch of Bluechip Protocols raising similar demand of such system for governance .

I think it might need the help of Admins like @RoundElephant to connect with these student blockchain clubs on Twitter or Via Discord & Invite them Over Next 1inch DAO Community Call & Reach to a less friction free collaboration after judging their Expertise in this field.

Seems important to Foster more public Action in 1inch DAO votings & Proposal Constrution & Discussions

The selection system criteria can be more streamlined but as for starters it’s looking fine as we can make changes later on too .

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That seems like a good Idea .

I was also thinking if we should add some Financial Incentives for governance participation of such clubs but I think @RoundElephant & their Team already on it .

Or Maybe Allocate to Buyback 1inch from treasury by DCA’ing & then Allocating voting power to different clubs after their selection . need more discussion over that , maybe we can put such questions on dao communiy calls if they invite 1 - 2 clubs to know their opinion over this .


Such participation imo is very much needed for further Treasury & Dao development

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Let me first say that I love the idea of this proposal and it seems like a good way of getting a lot of really smart people with fresh ideas and some free-time to burn engaged in the DAO. And who would be better suited than students?!

Longterm, if the DAO moves in favor of this proposal, I could see this system evolving into a way to secure collaborative contributions as well as the well-informed votes that it is initially geared towards.

That’s actually what I wanted to know when I was reading this proposal (you guys all know by now that I’m obsessed with numbers).

Right now there is nothing stopping a group of students from doing this on their own, but also nothing pushing them towards doing so. On that note, there really isn’t an incentive pushing stakers to delegate their stake in the first place. Seeing as no groups have stepped up so far, and that delegation participation is low, I think it would definitely need to be incentivized somehow. So, the two main questions I had were:

  • How much of the DAO’s treasury should we allot to this program?
    • Both in terms of funds going to the meta-delegates and in terms of incentivizing delegation in the first place (we might be able to break that second part out into a separate campaign on Layer3 or something as we need people to start delegating either way).
  • How do we hold the Meta-Delegate teams accountable?

We should think about ways to answer these questions since the answers will define the implications of this proposal.


Blockchain clubs delegates > Individual 4261-cooldoggo

I think we should do 5% of treasury as a start , convert usdc to 1inch & get st1inch & then if @Genkai.Shogun proposal passes that st1inch will start generating revenue that can be redeemed by these clubs & also The voting Power created from this st1inch can be divided into these clubs acc. to their Delegation pitch or Activity Gauge

By generating score system based on their snapshot participation & amount of involvement in forum topics . The Club with highest engagement will achieve top position in rank & leaderboard & thus will have most staking rewards distributed at the end of th season as compared to other clubs . This way there will always be a competitive force b/w them to do better .

This can be made into a UI

Gonna put a vote of allocating special treasury for -

no more than 10% of treasury
no more than 5%
no more than 15%
etc in next phase to check dao general sentiment

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This is a great initiative and it’s a nice coincidence that you plan to launch this just now when I came back to your forum to check on the current governance process and active stakeholders.

I’ve been in the process of launching ScaleWeb3 and plan to become much more active with this entity specifically in the governance process of top DeFi, Eth l2 and Polkadot projects. Besides governance, we will mainly focus on ecosystem building.

RE: The specifics in this (meta-)governance initiative

With this program, Various dedicated organizations will be able to hold discussions, work on specific activities, propose new ideas, & participate in building the future of the 1inch protocol. This will welcome organizations interested in the topic of DAOs, contributing significantly to the growth of the 1inch ecosystem.

  • Completely agree with the simple summary, most listed governance issues, and the following motivation that specifies a competitive advantage of having the most knowledgable people around (with a vested interest!)

  • As addressed later-on, organizations, student clubs & co will not engage in discussions without a certain self-interest/reward. I am not a fan of incentivizing governance participation to have some governance (gaming) system in place (“decentralization theater”) but rather the long-term participation of quality parties in the process (investors, parties working on certain tasks, working group for xyz)

  • Blockchain Clubs are a good stakeholder group to have in your ecosystem (e.g. onboarding funnel for new contributors) but not the ideal long-term governance stewards imo. I also do not see a big difference among individuals, companies, collectives as some individuals are extremely active in governance or simply add more value through an occassional contribution than a “consistently scoring low value org” and wouldn’t exclude certain parties from this governance booster program.

  • I like the idea of a score system but I’d look also for different KPIs here

Overall, fantastic intiative. I would keep it simple in the first place, make sure that existing stakeholders step up in governance and steadily grow the number of value-adders for the ecosystem.

Obviously, as a company, I’d be happy to see a big portion of treasury funds delegated to this program but as a token holder, core contributor or future delegate, I’d rather see this governance process and some budget evolve step by step iteratively.

Happy to help with the program, or as a future delegate. I’ll be around.



Well I agree somewhat on that & it might sound like Bribing people to make them govern things . But isn’t the incentives are the Major Drive to everything ?

Whether it’s bitcoin that gives bitcoin for solving computation by mining via PoW
or whether it is Defi where airdrop , lending , borrowing , farming everything connected with some sort of rewards . Infact every major company did this during their early days .

Then we get to play 2 earn , move 2 earn , engage to earn , learn 2 earn . Isn’t all this one way or another incentivizing people & people like to get rewarded for the time they spent on these dapps .

Maybe Incentives don’t really need to be in cash but something valuable or like a token of appreciation of the work the have done . Maybe it’s connected with the Driving factor that makes participation worth the time :thinking:


Well this is just a start & nobody is restricted to join . So , All Fair & Square .

Absolutely . Maybe we can run short Trials on these & can devise more metrics later on too . If you’ve 1 in mind then you can discuss it :slight_smile:


I think the score system will be crucial, but is it possible to design such a system where the teams that the system will rate and the teams we want to rate match up?
The design of this system would have to be fleshed out by the time the snapshot is voted on, right?

I’m also wondering if it wouldn’t cause controversy when the system and human evaluations differ. If a score system is feasible, and we are going in that direction, we might want to consider mixing in a certain percentage of human evaluations as well.


I like your concern & initially , i actually thought of some sort of committee formation but i don’t want scoring system that need human intervention . I want it open ended & automatic without delays .

I think this is where A Task Based & XP model can come in handy . Generating Xperience points to rank up in leaderboard by being doing most activity during polls & snapshot etc. We can also divide in such proportions too

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There’s quite a big difference between

  • incentivizing the right behavior in a protocol with pseudonymous, non-aligned people (Bitcoin);

  • some random, unsustainable token incentives that may achieve a short-term goal (fake KPIs to raise funds, bootstrapping, dump on retail, etc.);

  • and ultimately real governance involvement that should lead to a better protocol, token price, ecosystem…

So, I don’t want governance participation as a goal. If this is the goal, then it’s similar to DeFi airdrop hunting, the NFT whitelist & flipping game, or super bad play-to-earn schemes.

For governance, I’d like to see a good governance setup & process (whether that is business org approach with boards, or a leaner, flat org with OKRs), and prefer the incentivization (definitely monetary) of quality contributions and good decisions which should reflect in long-term outcomes.

imo we don’t need to reinvent the wheel for 1inch, and we shouldn’t replicate the same mistakes many crypto projects made in the past and waste $$$. Hence, we can look at some best practices & interesting approaches from Maker, Gitcoin, Uma, Index & co:


  • Incentivized (correct) voting which is decentralization theater + a bit of onboarding community to governance

  • Created KPI options that can be leveraged by a whole token community, working groups, etc.

  • Created SuperUMAn DAO to bootstrap community and run DAO-to-DAO relations which is smart for very specific products/tasks, to improve connections across crypto and community involvement


  • imo the forum with the highest quality governance participation which somewhat organically achieved this by launching with a centralized foundation that pushed the initial agenda, then organically outgrowing that foundation, starting organizing in working groups and now getting lots of quality posts in the public from working groups, long-term holders, other projects that like to work/integrate with MakerDao and more recently also delegates.

  • MakerDao achieved quite some stuff with the leaderless flat org in the past year but there are limits and many advocate now for new super delegated to oversee the working groups & establish strategy. As we see, centralization, decentralization comes in waves and imo the iterative process and organic growth is king.


  • Gitcoin DAO was well-launched re governance and has attracted quality governance participants with the clear mission to build and fund digital public goods. Besides the company, the DAO has different working groups which got to ask delegates for budgets. As delegates such as Lefteris are well-aligned with the mission, criticial issues such as overspending and cutting costs are also addressed.

  • Obv, through the Gitcoin platform, hackathons, and Kernel program, Gitcoin managed to position themselves well in the ecosystem - which helps with finding great delegates

Index Coop

  • Well-run working groups, lots of good communication in the forums which is ultimately also helping with overcoming some flawed initial distribution ideas that had little incentives for new DAO contributors and strategists competing with each other

  • Programs for internships, for onboarding to the DAO, Dao-to-Dao groups, etc.

  • Compensation framework for DAO contributors which includes qualitative assessments and is better suited than a score that calculates some forum engagement

Just based on these couple of examples, I think we can see that plain incentives to vote are probably not the right instrument - especially considering that there are more and more DAOs and you want to meaningfully differentiate, become better, and attract the best talent as stated early on.

Admittedly, I am not too familiar with the overall 1inch setup & stakeholders except the strong role of the foundation so far but I feel there is a whole framework missing for the Dao, the goals for community & governance now as well as a clear funnel… so that a governance booster or iterative improvements of governance processes will really kick in and help achieve those goals.


Actually , The incentives if it may happen , are not targeted for influencing the votes but a reason to just Vote . Just like how political parties do campaigns and stuff & cheer people to Go & Vote . These are just made certainly to do that .

Whether you Vote Yes , No or Abstain , doesn’t matter . It doesn’t matter what you choose or how you choose & it never intended to influenece those decisions .

But You shoule Vote . That’s what actually Matters the Most & that’s what these incentives are here for .

Maybe Governance Participation is not a Goal but it’ll be suitable to deem it as a Collective Goal for all Who Hold the 1inch Token in some way & Make it useful in a way to build up decisons for betterment & Progress of the Protocol .

If Governance is not a collective goal , then what is even a purpose remained for a Governace Token like $1inch to achieve ?

That i Agree with you .

Also in case if you don’t know @RoundElephant is working on a Very Special Governance UI/UX as we speak to address all the concerns of frictional Governance participation .

About the Projects you stated I see they also wanted to Structure the Governance system as well & 1 of your example is MakerDAO , being the Oldest DAO , i think they’re trying like every way to make DAO better whether it’s Extensive Achievement Forum Profiles of Delegates etc. or whether it’s their SourceCred Trials . All to make DAO more better . Maybe they also Got 1st Mover Advantage too .


:atom_symbol: Current Updates 21.5.2022

  1. Added Treasury Fund Allocation Poll
  1. Score System

I don’t think We need a score system or really rare KPI during 1st Trial . There’s Nothing at stake . If the Trial fails to deliever what it intented to i.e. Participation & Contribution . Then All Funds will remain at the hand of Treasury for Next Trials .

  1. Added More Benefits of this Program to the Clubs

All these without Any Burden Over Treasury ! No sell Pressure over token . Nothing .

Initiating to Phase - 2 for further formalization


If Governance is not a collective goal , then what is even a purpose remained for a Governace Token like $1inch to achieve ?

  1. Coordination/good incentivization of all the different stakeholders to grow the project.

  2. Governance decisions on granular Revenue Sharing across stakeholders, protocol & ecosystem development (however, the degree of community involvement is up to each project and I’m totally fine if a core team wants to take most important decisions and only some aspects are governable)

MakerDAO , being the Oldest DAO , i think they’re trying like every way to make DAO better whether it’s Extensive Achievement Forum Profiles of Delegates etc. or whether it’s their SourceCred Trials. All to make DAO more better .

Agree, and would add that they are coming closer and closer to what a DAO structure should look like with working groups, delegates, superdelegates to postitively influence and govern the future of the project.

Looking forward to the trial and next steps :+1:


i like and total support the team.

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@chicoproducion @3.1415r @ma70_supra @ScaleWeb3 Phase - 2 is LIVE